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THE CHANGING FACE OF PARENTS' RIGHTS 
Ralph D. Mawdsley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, courts have 
recognized the right of parents to make educational decisions 
for their children. Courts and legislatures have sought to 
balance the states' authority to educate students1 with the 
parents' natural authority to raise their children.2 However, 
the legal basis for such balancing of interests has changed. 
Parents' rights have evolved over four historical periods and 
have been influenced in the past thirty years by changing 
perspectives concerning the rights of students, school boards, 
and justiciable causes of action. 
During the first of the four historical periods, spanning the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, various 
state courts fashioned common law to determine whether 
parents could make decisions contrary to the rules of local 
school boards. During the second period, beginning with the 
end of World War I, state legislatures took a more active role in 
* Ralph D. Mawdsley is a Professor of Educational Administration at Cleveland State 
University in Cleveland, Ohio. He received his J.D. from the University of Illinois and 
his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses in school 
law, special education law, and sports law. He has published more than 250 articles 
and books on numerous legal issues in the field of education. Dr. Mawdsley is a past 
president of the Education Law Association, a national organization of attorneys, 
higher education faculty, and educational practitioners. 
1. Public education is primarily a province of the states because article I, section 
8 of the U.S. Constitution does not designate education as one of the functions 
delegated to the national government. Although the federal government has enacted 
legislation involving various mandates for education, the primary responsibility for 
determining the content and implementation of education resides with states. See 
generally Mark Yudof, David L. Kirp, and Betsy Levin, Educational Policy and the Law 
1-2 (3d ed., West 1992). 
2. See Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("Corresponding to the right of 
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to 
their station in life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this 
obligation by compulsory laws."). 
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designing compulsory attendance laws. Two prominent United 
States Supreme Court decisions during this period facially 
challenged the authority of states to prohibit the operation of 
nonpublic schools. In the third period, courts wrestled with the 
rights of parents to direct their children's education for 
religious reasons. This followed a prominent Supreme Court 
decision addressing the authority of states to apply facially 
neutral compulsory attendance laws to religious-based 
nonpublic schools. Finally, in the current and fourth period, 
Congress and state legislatures have attempted to restore some 
authority to parents. However, parents, frequently frustrated 
with such legislative efforts, have tried to assert a variety of 
legal claims against public schools. 
This article will be divided into two parts to discuss the 
changing face of parent rights in directing their children's 
education. In the first part, the article will examine the four 
historical periods of development referenced above, focusing on 
relevant court decisions. This examination of time periods will 
show that as the rights of parents to direct the education of 
their children have evolved, so also have the rights of students, 
school officials, and others in the education process. The second 
part of the article will examine how parents' successes in 
asserting their rights against public schools have been affected 
by legal developments over the past thirty years. This section 
will analyze the extent to which the development of student 
rights and school board authority has affected claims by 
parents under new causes of action. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARENTS' RIGHT TO DIRECT 
THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION 
A. Period One: Parents' Rights and the Common Law 
Before the Supreme Court created a right of parents to 
direct the education of their children through the liberty clause 
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 3 states used common law to resolve 
school-parent disputes concerning school-required curriculum 
or activities.4 In Hardwick v. Board of Trustees,5 a California 
3. ld. at 390. 
4. See e.g. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18, Garvin County v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 579 
(Okla. 1909) ("At common law the principal duties of parents to their legitimate 
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court queried, "Has the state the right to enact a law or confer 
upon any public authorities a power the effect of which would 
be to alienate in a measure the children from parental 
authority?"6 The court responded that compelling a student to 
participate in the social and folk dancing part of the school's 
physical education program violated the parent's right to 
control the education of their children.7 
[T]o require [children] to live up to the teachings and 
the principles which are inculcated in them at home 
under the parental authority and according to what the 
parents themselves may conceive will be the course of 
conduct in all matters which will be the better and more 
surely subserve the present and future welfare of their 
children.8 
Hardwick is representative of court decisions upholding 
objections to required courses either because of the strong 
interest parents have in their children9 or because honoring the 
parent request would not be disruptive to the school. 10 
However, parents have not always succeeded in having 
their children excused from a required course. In such cases, 
courts relied on both the authority of state legislatures and 
school boards to set course requirements, and a fear that 
citizens should not be able to nullify reasonable legislation. 11 At 
children consisted in their maintenance, their protection, and their education. These 
duties were imposed upon principles of natural law and affection laid on them not only 
by Nature herself, but by their own proper act of bringing them into the world."). 
5. Hardwick u. Bd. of Trustees, 205 P. 49 (Cal. 3d. Dist. App. 1921). 
6. ld. at 54. 
7. Id. at 49. 
8. Id. at 54. 
9. State ex rel. Kelley u. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039 (Neb. 1914) (parent could make 
a reasonable selection among required courses and decide that his daughter would not 
take domestic science so as to have more time to practice her music); Trustees of Sch. u. 
People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (Ill. 1877) (school could not refuse to admit student 
to high school who was proficient in all required subjects except grammar where parent 
refused to permit his son to study grammar and grammar was not one of the subjects 
that student would study); Garvin County, 103 P. 578 (court ordered reinstatement of 
student expelled for refusal to participate in singing lessons as per instruction from 
parent); Morrow u. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (Wis. 1874) (school teacher had no authority to 
use corporal punishment on a student whose parent had forbidden the child to 
participate in geography). 
10. State ex rel. Sheibley u. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Dixon County, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 
1891) (school district could not expel student whose father refused to permit her to 
study grammar where there was no evidence that her refusal was insubordinate). 
11. See Sewell u. Bd. of Educ. of Defiance Union Sch., 29 Ohio St. 89 (Ohio 1876) 
(suspension of student for refusal to have rhetoric exercise prepared was upheld as 
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the heart of this support for schools was general desire to 
preserve the school's image as a symbol of authority deserving 
of respect from students and their parents. Whenever a school 
regulation was subjected to challenge, courts expressed the fear 
that an attack on the authority of school personnel to make and 
enforce rules would produce disrespect for that authority. As a 
result, some courts presumed school actions to be reasonable.12 
The success of parents in advancing common law claims to 
control the education of their children not only varied among 
the states but represented a largely agrarian society where 
both the authority of schools boards and parents were 
significant local forces. 13 However, with the end ofWorld War I, 
state legislatures became more active in education by enacting 
compulsory attendance laws. The shift to statewide legislation 
had a diluting effect on the common law authority of parents. 
While parental authority was a prominent force when balanced 
against the authority of local school boards, it was not as 
significant when balanced against state-legislated rules. 
Therefore, parents needed a constitutional right to assert 
equally against all states. Parents found just such a right in 
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska 14 and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 15 
B. Period Two: Parents' Rights and the Constitution 
In Meyer and Pierce, the Supreme Court found within the 
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a right for parents 
to direct their children's education. This right created a more 
powerful force to balance against the authority of states to 
control education. In Meyer, the Court addressed the 
pursuant to a reasonable school board rule); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473 (N.H. 1879) 
(teacher acted appropriately in removing student from school who refused, pursuant to 
parent directive, to prepare a speech in public declamation class); Samuel Benedict 
Meml. Sch. v. Bradford, 36 S.E. 920 (Ga. 1900) (student who refused to prepare a paper 
for an assignment, but instead read a paper prepared by his parent, could be 
suspended). 
12. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 182 Ill.App. 342 (Ill. App. 
1914) (student could be expelled for joining a secret society in violation of school board 
rule); Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 62 S.W. 872 (Ky. 1901) (expulsion of student upheld for 
improper conduct). 
13. See generally Lawrence Cremin, The American Common School, An Historic 
Conception (Columbia 1951). 
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. 
15. Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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constitutionality of a state compulsory attendance statute 
providing for a criminal penalty if any school subjects were 
taught in a foreign language. 16 When a teacher in a religious 
school was charged with teaching the subject of reading in 
German to a ten-year-old student, the Court responded by 
striking down the statute under the liberty clause. The Court 
reasoned that "[the teacher's] right thus to teach and the right 
of parents to engage him so to instruct their children"17 were 
protected by the Constitution. Not only did parents have a 
constitutional righe8 to direct their children's education, but 
the right extended derivative protection to teachers. The Court 
found the right to be "within the liberty [clause] of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment."19 
Pierce represented a different challenge for the Supreme 
Court. In Pierce, the Court addressed a state compulsory 
attendance statute that required all parents to send their 
children to public schools.20 Two nonpublic schools, one 
16. The court cited a statute providing that: 
'Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, 
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in 
any language than the English language. 
'Section 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as 
languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the 
eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county 
superintendent of the county in which the child resides. 
'Section 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a 
fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred 
dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding 
thirty days for each offense. 
'Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after 
its passage and approval.' 
262 U.S. at 397. 
17. !d. at 400. 
18. The Court expanded the protected categories under the liberty clause to 
include parent choice of education: 
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men. 
Id. at 399. 
19. Id. at 400. 
20. The court cited a statute that provided in substance that 
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religious and the other secular,21 challenged the statute under 
the liberty and property clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In invalidating the state statute, the Court, relying on Meyers, 
opined that "we think it entirely plain that the [state statute] 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children."22 
In one of its clearest statements of parent rights, the Court 
proclaimed that "the child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations."23 
In both Meyer and Pierce, the Supreme Court dealt with 
state statutes that were considered to be facially 
unconstitutional because they overstepped state legislative 
authority to control parent-directed education. Neither case 
addressed a facially constitutional statute that, when applied 
to parents, might be unconstitutional. This test came forty-
seven years after Pierce in Wisconsin v. Yoder (Yoder).24 
C. Period Three: Parents' Rights and Neutral Compulsory 
Attendance Laws 
In Yoder, the Supreme Court addressed the application of a 
state's compulsory attendance law to the Amish who, because 
of their unique religious beliefs and community,25 wanted their 
[E]ffective September 1, 1926, [the Act] requires every parent, guardian, or 
other person having control or charge or custody of a child between 8 and 16 
years to send him 'to a public school for the period of time a public school 
shall be held during the current year' in the district where the child resides; 
and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. 
Id. at 530. 
21. The two schools were Society of the Sister of the Holy Names of Jesus and 
Mary and Hill Military Academy. 
22. Id. at 534. 
23. Id. 
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
25. The Court relates the Amish parents' objection to their children's attendance 
at public schools: 
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish 
beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile 
to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and 
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the 
peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community, 
physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent 
period of life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish attitudes 
favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to 
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children to attend school only through the eighth grade. Unlike 
the statutes in Meyer and Pierce, the statute in Yoder was 
neutral on its face; it simply required that all students attend 
school between the ages of seven and sixteen without specifying 
curriculum content or that the school be public.26 However, the 
law in Yoder, as applied to the Amish, would have had a 
devastating effect on the Amish community. The Amish feared 
that requiring their children to attend public high schools for 
two or three years past their completion of the eighth grade in 
one-room Amish schools would cause a significant number of 
children to leave the Amish community. 
In rejecting the reach of the state law to the Amish, the 
Yoder Court looked to Pierce "as a charter of the rights of 
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."27 
However, unlike Meyer and Pierce, which dealt with state 
statutes that were facially unconstitutional, the Yoder Court 
opined that the state law raised "no doubt as to the power of a 
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, 
to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of 
basic education."28 
Yoder added a protectable parental interest to Meyer and 
Pierce under the free exercise clause29 that required the 
perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They must learn to 
enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned basic reading, writing, and 
elementary mathematics, these traits, skills, and attitudes admittedly fall 
within the category of those best learned through example and 'doing' rather 
than in a classroom. And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow 
in his faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he is to be 
prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short, 
high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith-and 
may even be hostile to it- interposes a serious barrier to the integration of 
the Amish child into the Amish religious community. 
Id. at 211-212. 
26. Wis. Stat. § 118.15 (1969). 
27. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
28. Id. at 229. Both Meyer and Pierce also had recognized that the state could 
enact reasonable regulations. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 ("The power of the state to 
compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, 
including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not 
questioned."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 ("No question is raised concerning the power of 
the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, 
their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, 
that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain 
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught 
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."). 
29. The religion clause was not applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
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government to demonstrate a compelling interest in a literate 
and productive citizenry30 before it could overcome the parents' 
interest.31 Where parents' interests in directing their children's 
education was "one of deep religious conviction, shared by an 
organized group, and intimately related to daily living,"32 Yoder 
strengthened parents' rights when balanced against state 
interests. 
Although Yoder suggests a strengthening of Meyer and 
Pierce by combining a parent's right to direct education under 
the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the free 
exercise clause, Yoder may also be a limitation because it 
restricted liberty clause protection to threatened religious 
beliefs. An even more restrictive interpretation of Yoder might 
suggest that liberty clause protection only applied to groups 
that "assert . . . an article of faith [and] their religious beliefs 
[and whose] 'life style' [has] not altered in fundamentals for 
centuries."33 
Despite the euphoria of the moment regarding the Yoder 
decision, the Court's decision was unclear as to whether the 
case would be limited to parents like the Amish. The Court's 
declaration that "a regulation neutral on its face may, in its 
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement 
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion"34 did not define how the limits might apply 
as to the reach of state regulations. 
In fact, subsequent state and federal courts wrestled with 
the application of the Meyer-Pierce-Yoder trilogy to state efforts 
to impose state laws and regulations that limited parent 
choices for their children. In State of Ohio v. Whisner 
(Whisner),35 the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the truancy 
Amendment until Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
30. The State's interests were that "some degree of education is necessary to 
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system 
if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares 
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Yoder, 406 U.S. 
at 221. 
31. Id. at 219-234. 
32. Id. at 216. 
33. I d. at 217. The Amish lifestyle was characterized as a consistent pattern over 
300 years of preserving "their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work" 
while rejecting modern conveniences such as "telephones, automobiles, radios, and 
television." Id. at 217, 219. 
34. Id. at 220. 
35. Ohio v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). 
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conviction of parents who sent their children to a religious 
school that could not meet many of the state's public school 
requirements, including facility, credentialing, and curriculum 
"minimum standards". In relying on Yoder, the Whisner court 
"conclude[d] that the compendium of 'minimum standards' 
promulgated by the State Board of Education, taken as a 
whole, 'unduly burdens the free exercise of (appellants') 
religion."36 In looking to Meyer and Pierce, the court concluded 
that 
[u]nder the facts of this case, the right of [parents] to 
direct the upbringing and education of their children in 
a manner in which they deem advisable, indeed 
essential, and which we cannot say is harmful, has been 
denied by application of the state's 'minimum 
standards' as to them.37 
However, where state efforts to regulate parents' 
educational choices were less pervasive, courts were less 
disposed to support the rights of parents. For example, in 
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton,38 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the application of Iowa's teacher 
certification requirement to a religious school, even though the 
school might not have been able to find religiously acceptable 
certified teachers. Citing Pierce for support of the state's claim, 
the court noted that the state had "a compelling interest in the 
education of its children."39 In addition, the court dismissed the 
parents' claim that they were entitled to be treated the same as 
the Amish in Yoder, reasoning that they would not suffer as 
much harm as the Amish would if the Amish were required to 
attend public school beyond the eighth grade.40 In other words, 
while states were prohibited from legislating nonpublic schools 
out of existence in Pierce, states might be able to effect a 
similar result by applying a limited number of regulations that 
36. ld. at 764. 
37. ld. at 770. 
38. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987). 
39. Id. at 490 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510). 
40. The court found "more dissimilarities than similarities" between the plaintiffs 
in Fellowship Baptist and the Amish. Plaintiffs lived "in ordinary residential 
neighborhoods," performed "ordinary occupations such as a nurse, lawyer, engineer, 
and accountant [and did not] object to the licensing of these occupations," used modern 
conveniences such as "radios, televisions, and motor vehicles," and had no 
"distinctive ... dress or lifestyle." ld. at 489. 
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the schools would have difficulty complying with.41 
In retrospect, Yoder is the high-water mark for parents' 
religious-based educational decisions on behalf of children. 
Following Yoder, courts tended to reduce their compelling 
interest test to one of reasonableness.42 When the Supreme 
Court, in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith),43 declared 
that "a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law"44 does not 
implicate a free exercise claim, the free exercise clause largely 
lost its effectiveness as a separate and sole cause of action. 45 A 
brief post-Smith resurgence of the Yoder compelling interest 
test with Congress's passage of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRAt6 met with failure when the Supreme 
41. See also Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Dept. of Educ., 348 N.W.2d 263 
(Mich. App. 1984) (application of teacher certification upheld); State ex rel. Douglas v. 
Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981) (court upheld broad 
range of state requirements necessary for state approval); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 
883 (N.D. 1980) (state department regulations specifYing the courses required to be 
taught held reasonable). 
42. See Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d 1311 (Mont. 1997) {court applied 
rational purpose test in denying student enrolled in Christian Day School permission 
to participate in public school sports); Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, 312 N.W.2d 
at 580 (court upheld application of state teacher certification requirement to church-
controlled school because the requirement was neither "arbitrary nor unreasonable"); 
Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church, 348 N.W.2d at 274 (court upheld application of teacher 
certification to religious school as "reasonable means to give effect to a broader, 
compelling state interest- in this case the provision of education to all children."). 
43. Empl. Diu., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
(Court refused to recognize the claim of two plaintiffs, denied unemployment 
compensation benefits because of the use of a prohibited drug [peyote] during an 
American Indian ceremony, for an exemption based on their religious beliefs that 
required that they use the hallucinatory drug.). 
44. !d. at 880. 
45. For a discussion of the devastating effect of Smith, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, 
Employment Division v. Smith Revisited: The Constriction of Free Exercise Rights 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 76 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1992). Free exercise is still a viable 
claim where government action demonstrates hostility toward religion. See Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Court struck down 
four city ordinances, ostensibly directed at preventing the death of animals, but with so 
many exceptions that the purpose was to prevent only the Santeria religion's practice 
of animal sacrifices.). Smith recognized that free exercise could be a valid claim when 
combined with another substantive right, such as parents' right to direct the education 
of their children. See Peterson v. Mimidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351 
(9th Cir. 1997) (demotion of principal to a teaching position for home-schooling his 
children for religious reasons held to be a violation of the principal's free exercise rights 
and right to direct education of children). 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000) (RFRA had as one of its purposes "to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder . ... " In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963), the Supreme Court 
required that the government prove that its regulation was the least restrictive means 
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Court struck down RFRA as a violation of the separation of 
powers.47 
D. Period Four: Parents' Rights and Legislative Efforts 
With the demise of the free exercise clause as an effective 
restriction on government regulation of parent educational 
choices, only the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
remained as a constitutional limitation on states and local 
school districts. However, parents' efforts since Smith to invoke 
the Meyer and Pierce liberty clause right to direct their 
children's education have been generally ineffective.48 
Does the lack of success using the liberty clause mean that 
parents no longer have any legal basis for asserting their 
educational claims against school districts? With the exception 
of an emerging but generally unsuccessful effort by parents to 
assert free speech claims against public schools on behalf of 
their children,49 parents have looked to Congress and state 
legislatures to protect their interests. 
The two most prominent federal statutes asserting parental 
authority have been the Family Rights and Privacy Act of 197 4 
(FERPA)50 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975 (hereinafter referred to under its current title, IDEA).51 
For the first time under FERPA, Congress created a national 
right of unrestricted access by parents to the education records 
of their children, as well as a more limited right to control 
of accomplishing its interest). See Porth u. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalmamazoo, 
532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. App. 1995) (RFRA prohibited state religious discrimination 
claim by non-renewed protestant teacher in Catholic school). 
47. City of Boerne u. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Court upheld local ordinance, 
neutral on its face, establishing historic landmarks, when applied to a church 
designated as an historic landmark, even though the effect of the application of the 
ordinance prevented the church from altering the fa~;ade of its church as it wanted in 
order to make room for a much-needed addition.). 
48. Occasionally, a court relies on Meyer or Pierce. See Veschi u. Northwestern 
Lehigh Sch. Dist., 772 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. Cmmw. 2001) (court rejected public school 
district claim that it did not have to provide IDEA special education services to a child 
in a religious school unless the child enrolled in the public school by observing that the 
parents "have a constitutionally protected right to decide where [their son] goes to 
school under Pierce u. Society of Sisters."). 
49. See e.g. Settle u. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) (court 
upheld teacher's refusal to permit student to write biography on life of Jesus Christ 
where teacher mistakenly placed part of her decision on her factual error and on a 
misunderstanding of the legal relationship between religion and public schools). 
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000). 
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000). 
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disclosure of their children's education records. Under FERPA, 
parents have "the right to inspect and review the education 
records of their children,"52 the right "to challenge the content 
of such student's education records,"53 and the right to prevent 
disclosure of students' records (with specified exceptions) 
"without the written consent of their parents."54 
IDEA went even further, declaring parents of special 
education students to be equal partners with public schools in 
determining the educational program for their children and the 
services necessary to achieve that program. 55 Congress declared 
as one of its findings in enacting IDEA that the "education of 
children with disabilities can be more effective by ... 
strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that families of 
such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in 
the education of their children at school and at home."56 
State legislatures have also strengthened parents' rights. 
For example, state statutes contributed to parents' selection of 
nonpublic school venues for their children by restricting the 
number of regulations. Extensive litigation in the 1970s and 
1980s regarding the application of state compulsory attendance 
regulations to nonpublic schools57 has given way to statutory 
exemptions from many of these regulations. 58 State legislatures 
have found ways to minimize state intrusion into curriculum, 
personnel, and student matters m nonpublic schools.59 
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(l)(A). 
53. ld. at § 1232(g)(2). 
54. ld. at§ 1232(6)(b)(1). 
55. For example, parents have the procedural right "to examine all relevant 
records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the 
child, and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child .... " Id. at § 
1415 (b)(1). The IEP is a "written statement of each handicapped child developed in 
any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency, ... the teacher, the 
parents or guardians of the child." Id. at§ 1401(19). 
56. ld. at§ 1400(5)(B). 
57. For a discussion of this litigation, see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Legal 
Problems of Religious Schools and Private Schools 163-195 (Educ. L. Assn. 2000). 
58. See e.g. the Iowa Code Ann. which exempts: 
[R]eligious groups . . . from school standards when members or 
representatives of a local congregation of a recognized church or religious 
denomination established for ten years or more within the state of Iowa prior 
to July 1, 1967, ... professes principles or tenets that differ substantially 
from the objectives, goals, and philosophy of education embodied in standards 
set forth in [the [the state code] .... " 
Iowa Code Ann. § 299.24 
59. Ohio requires that for every child who "attends upon instruction elsewhere 
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Although not all of these legislative accommodations come with 
a legislative history, the overall effect has been to facilitate 
parents' direction of their children's education by making the 
operation of nonpublic schools less onerous. All states now 
recognize home schooling as a permissible parent option, 
although some states exert more regulatory control than 
others.6° For, some states permit students participating in 
nonpublic schools (including home schools) to take part in 
public school courses and extracurricular activities, including 
athletics.61 
However, the accommodations made by states regarding 
parents' direction of their children's education apply largely to 
the choice of the place where the child will be taught. Most 
states do not permit parents to intrude into curricular matters 
in public schools. One prominent exception is the 
comprehensive Parents Rights and Responsibilities Act passed 
in Texas in 2000.62 This act provides a parent access "to all 
written records of a school district concerning the parent's 
child."63 In addition, parents can petition the school principal to 
add a course, to permit their child "to attend a class for credit 
than in a public school such instruction shall be in a school which conforms to the 
minimum standards prescribed by the state board of education," [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3321.07 (West 2002] which requires only that a nonpublic school be equivalent with 
area public schools. See also State v. Hershberger, 144 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio App. 1955) (a 
one-room school without artificial light and being taught by a teacher with less than an 
eighth grade education was not equivalent). Minnesota requires that "a child receiving 
instruction from a nonpublic school, person, or institution that is accredited by an 
accrediting agency, recognized according to [Minn. Stat. Ann.] § 123B.445, or 
recognized by the commissioner, is exempt from requirements" pertaining to teacher 
certification and curriculum. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 120A.22(11)(d) (West 2001). 
60. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3321.04(A)(2) (West 2002) (A student is 
exempted from attending a public or non public schools if "the child is being instructed 
at home by a person qualified to teach the branches in which instruction is required, 
and such additional branches, as the advancement and needs of the child may, in the 
opinion of such superintendent, require."). See generally Christine Field, Field Guide to 
Home Schooling (Fleming H. Revell 1998). 
61. See Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1984) (student 
attending a religious school had right under "an accepted method of education in this 
state for over 60 years" to attend a course in the public school."). Contra Swanson ex 
rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (lOth Cir. 1998) (home-schooled 
student did not have right to take foreign language, vocal music and science courses in 
public school). 
62. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 26.003-26.010 (2002). 
63. Id. at § 26.004 (The records are: attendance records, test scores, grades, 
disciplinary records, counseling records, psychological records, applications for 
admission, health and immunization information, teacher and counselor evaluations, 
and reports of behavior patterns.). 
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above the child's grade level", and to permit the child to 
graduate early if all courses required for graduation have been 
completed.64 The Texas statute states explicitly that such 
"request[s] will not be unreasonably denied." Finally, parents 
are entitled to review all teaching and test materials to be used 
by their children65 and "to remove [their children] temporarily 
from a class or other school activity that conflicts with the 
parent's religious or moral beliefs."66 
What the Texas statute does not provide, though, is a right 
for a student to substitute an alternative assignment when the 
original assignment is considered offensive on religious or 
moral grounds. In other words, a parent's right to remove a 
child from an objectionable course does not translate into a 
right to replace the assignment.67 
At least one other state, Michigan, has declared that "it is 
[a] natural, fundamental right of parents and legal guardians 
to determine and direct the care, teaching, and education of 
their children."68 However, the extent of parent rights is not 
nearly as great as in Texas and parent rights to affect 
curriculum are limited only to courses dealing with "sex 
education."69 
Although federal and state statutes have increased parental 
authority in some areas, no broad sweeping constitutional 
protection exists such as might have been anticipated after 
Meyer and Pierce. Both cases sowed the seeds for their own 
limited effectiveness by recognizing that states could apply 
reasonable regulations to nonpublic schools. Parental efforts to 
direct their children's education today have gone far beyond the 
64. Id. at§ 26.003. 
65. I d. at§ 26.006. 
66. Id. at § 26.010. However, "a parent is not entitled to remove the parent's child 
from a class or other school activity to avoid a test or prevent the child from taking a 
subject for an entire semester," nor does this provision "exempt a child from satisfYing 
grade level or graduation requirements in a manner acceptable to the school district 
and the [state education] agency." 
67. The law on the subject of replacement is still represented by Mozert u. 
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (parent who objected on 
religious grounds to reading series for daughter was not entitled to have school 
substitute an alternate, acceptable reading series.). 
68. Mich. Stat. Ann§ 380.10 (Lexis L. Publg. 2002). 
69. Id. at § 380.1507 (courses dealing with "family planning, human sexuality, 
and the emotional, physical, psychological, hygienic, economic, and social aspects of 
family life" must be an elective and parents must have the opportunity to review the 
contents of the course in advance and to have their children excused from the class.) 
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limited protection for nonpublic schools in Meyer and Pierce to 
seeking legislative support to effect changes in curriculum, 
activities or events within public schools. 
However, legislative support has been limited. As a result, 
parents have asserted a variety of legal theories to compel 
public schools to accommodate the wishes of parents regarding 
their children's education. The next section considers the 
barriers to parent claims and the most recent legal theory used 
by parents based on Title 20 of the United States Code § 1983. 
Ill. PARENTS' DIRECTION OF THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION 
WITHIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS DURING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS 
The efforts by parents to rely on constitutional theories and 
state and federal legislatures in effecting changes within public 
schools have been patchwork at best. Parents' attempts to 
bring direct legal action against public schools under a variety 
of§ 1983 claims have also not always been successful, largely 
due to various legal developments in public school law that 
have not been supportive of parent claims. Among the most 
significant of these developments has been the emergence of 
student rights. While parents' rights to make educational 
decisions for their children frequently overlap with their 
children's rights, the two sets of rights are not always so 
extensive. 
A. The Emergence of Student Rights 
Three years prior to Yoder, the Supreme Court, in Tinker u. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District,70 declared 
that "students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'m 
Although Tinker was the wellspring for students' rights, the 
case can just as easily be identified as a parents' rights case 
since the views expressed by the students in Tinker in wearing 
black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam represented the 
views of their parents.72 What Tinker did not address was how 
70. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
71. Id. at 506. 
72. I d. at 504. The court related these facts: 
In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a 
meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their 
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by 
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a court should deal with students' rights where student views 
differed from those of their parents. 
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Yoder, opined 
that courts have a responsibility to determine whether the 
educational decisions made by parents for their children 
represent the views of the child. As he observed, while parents 
"normally speak for the entire family ... , it is the student's 
judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give 
full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and 
of the right of students to be the masters of their own 
destiny.'m 
Justice Douglas's comment was the first recognition by the 
Supreme Court that children's interests may not always be 
represented by their parents. Three years after Yoder, in Baker 
v. Owen,74 the Court affirmed, without opinion, a federal 
district court decision involving the use of corporal punishment 
that bifurcated the claims of a parent and a student. In Baker, 
a parent who objected to a school's use of corporal punishment 
did not have a constitutional right to compel a school to 
discontinue use of that punishment.75 However, the student 
had a liberty clause interest in his own right to protect his 
bodily integrity.76 For the first time, the Court gave tacit 
affirmation to the idea that a student's own rights do not have 
to be identical with, or a derivative of, those of the parent. 
Although the Supreme Court in Baker did not author an 
opinion, its affirmation of the district court decision raises a 
tantalizing question regarding the balancing of rights between 
parents and children. Whose right is at issue in public schools -
that of the student or that of the parent? Could students' 
interests be in conflict with those of their parents, and, if so, 
what might be the implications for public schools? 
To date, courts (and legislatures) have taken steps to 
separate parent and child interests only in isolated situations 
such as child abuse reporting by school officials where the 
wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on 
December 16 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had 
previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in 
the program. 
73. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244-245 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
74. Baker u. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). 
75. Baker u. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affd without opinion, 423 
u.s. 907 (1975). 
76. Id. at 301. 
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alleged abuser may be a parent.77 Should this bifurcation of 
parent and student interests be extended to other areas? If 
children's rights are independent from those of their parents, 
can (or, should) schools equate parents' views with children's 
views? If such equation occurs, do the children have a 
constitutional right to assert their views? A case in point is the 
use of parent consent forms. 
Although parent consent forms can serve a number of 
purposes for schools,78 the underlying assumption is that 
students will not be permitted to participate in a school 
function without parent permission. The use of parent consent 
forms raises two issues: whether a parent's right to consent 
translates into an enforceable claim against a school if consent 
is not sought; and whether a student has an enforceable claim 
against a school to participate even if the parent does not grant 
consent. 
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, 
Incorporated,79 a high school principal's requirement that all 
students attend an assembly ostensibly dealing with AIDS 
awareness, 
80 
and the principal's refusal to use a parent consent 
form required for "instruction in human sexuality" did not 
translate into an actionable claim for violating parents' rights 
to direct the education of their children.81 The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals reasoned that, even though the school had 
77. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919 (lOth Cir. 1997) (court upheld 
county social services picking up a home-schooled seven-year-old child from his home 
and returning him seventeen and a half hours later in order to investigate alleged child 
abuse). 
78. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (parent 
consent form permitting elementary students to attend after-school religious club 
eliminated concern about students being coerced to attend the meeting). See also 
Summers v. Slivinsky, 749 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio App. 2001) (in a tort liability lawsuit, 
waiver and release forms signed by parents were questions of fact to be weighed by 
jury in determining whether cheerleader advisor had been reckless in pressuring 
injured student to participate). 
79. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
80. Among the activities at the assembly were the following: 
[P]rofane, lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and excretory 
function; advoca[cy] and approv(al] of oral sex, masturbation, homosexual 
activity and condom use during promiscuous premarital sex; simulated 
masturbation; and hav[ing] a male minor lick an oversized condom with [the 
female presenter],after which she had a female student pull it over the male 
minor's head and blow it up. 
Id. at 529. 
81. ld. at 532. 
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ignored its own parent consent form requirement, the parents' 
claim under Pierce failed because the right to educate one's 
children does not encompass "a fundamental constitutional 
right to dictate the curriculum at the public school."82 
Although this one-time refusal to seek parent permission in 
Hot, Sexy, and Safer did not give rise to a § 1983 claim under 
the liberty clause, what might have happened if the parent had 
denied permission, but the student wanted to attend the 
assembly? Does Tinker's right of private, student expression 
extend to students' rights to receive information against the 
wishes of their parents? In Board of Education, Island Trees 
Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,83 a plurality of the 
Supreme Court recognized that, at least as to school libraries, 
"the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the 
recipient's meaningful expression of his own rights of free 
speech .... "84 Do school officials run the risk of litigation from 
students when they require parent consent forms before 
students can view "R" rated films or attend assemblies or other 
meetings? To what extent can both students' free expression 
rights and parents' rights coexist in the same schools? 
To date, the notion that parents' rights can be separated 
from those of their children has not received general 
acceptance in the United States.85 Although the temptation to 
justify upholding children's rights at the expense of parents' 
rights may seem politically expedient to some, separating the 
82. Id. at 533. 
83. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 u. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 
(1982) (The Court struck down a school board's removal of eight books from the school 
library because the removal represented the politicaVreligious views of the board 
members.). 
84. ld. at 867. 
85. For a source for student rights apart from parents, see the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, ratified by U.N. General Assembly Nov. 20, 1989, but to which the 
U.S. along with Somalia are the only non-signers, which provides in Article 13: 
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of the child's choice. 
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these 
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals. 
Arguably, were the U.S. to become a signatory to the Convention, students might have 
the right to information independently from the views of parents. 
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rights of children from those of parents is a slippery slope that 
may well cause the fracturing of the family structure. 
B. The Reaffirmation of Public School Control Over 
Curriculum 
Local school boards' authority to control their schools was 
subjected to considerable challenges in the wake of Tinker. 86 In 
1986 and 1988, the Supreme Court acted through two 
prominent decisions, Bethel School District v. Fraser87 and 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 88 to reassert public 
school district control over their schools. 
In Bethel, the Court upheld the right of a school to 
discipline a student who made a speech with vulgar content 
and sexual innuendo to other students.89 Despite the parents' 
support for their child, the Court upheld the right of a school to 
"inculcate the habits and manners of civility."90 Bethel 
permitted public schools to project a set of values, even if the 
values disagreed with those of students and their parents. 
What Bethel did not determine, however, is how courts should 
apply the case to vulgar student expression that has the tacit 
or express support of parents. 
While Bethel supports the efforts of school officials to create 
a more civil and respectful school environment,91 not all vulgar 
student expression necessarily originates within the school 
environment. What options are available to school officials 
where words even more vulgar, lewd, and profane than those in 
Fraser are used to describe faculty or students on a student's 
Web page, created at home but accessible by students on school 
computers? Since lawsuits involving student expression are 
invariably brought by parents, how can such litigation be 
reconciled with parents' direction of their children's education? 
86. See generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Constitutional Rights of Students, in The 
Courts and Education 161-187 (Clifford P. Hooker, ed., Nat!. Socy. for the Study of 
Educ. 1978). 
87. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
88. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
89. 478 U.S. 675. 
90. ld. at 681. 
91. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 
1998), where termination of a teacher was upheld for violating a public school board's 
policy prohibiting the use of profanity. The teacher who taught English and joumalism 
had permitted the in-class performance and videotaping of student plays that included 
use of vulgar words violating the policy. 
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Do Meyer and Pierce extend to parental support of a child's use 
of vulgar and lewd language, especially when the language 
originated in the home? 
Up to the present, courts have tended to protect off-campus 
student expression, even when that expression is hurtful, 
harmful, and damaging to others within the school. 92 However, 
such protection may contain the seeds of destruction for the 
credibility of parental direction of education. If Bethel's support 
for public school civility and good manners is to have any 
meaning, parents arguably cannot lay claim to both the high 
ground of directing their children's education and at the same 
time support their children's right to be vulgar, lewd, or 
profane. In Bethel, one can argue that the Supreme Court drew 
a line in the sand not only as to the expression of offensive 
students but also as to the influence of those students' parents. 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that school officials 
have control over school curriculum.93 In this case, brought by 
three students, the Court distinguished between "a student's 
personal expression that happens to occur on the school 
premises" and "educators' authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school."94 
Despite a school board policy that student free expression 
would not be restricted for student publications,95 the Court 
opined that school officials were entitled to regulate publication 
contents "in any reasonable manner."96 If school officials "do not 
92. See Beussink u. Woodland R-N Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp.2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
(court granted preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement of student suspended for 
10 days for creating a Webpage critical of school officials where no evidence offered that 
Webpage had caused disruption at school when accessed); Emmett u. Kent Sch. Dist., 
92 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (court injunction prevented enforcement of four-
day suspension for creating Webpage with mock obituaries where no one was 
threatened on the Webpage). Cf. J.S. u. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. 
Cmmw. 2000) (court upheld expulsion of student whose Webpage offered picture of 
teacher with head cut off and dripping blood, accompanied by a twenty dollar offer to 
pay a hit-man to kill her). 
93. 484 U.S. 260. 
94. Id. at 271. 
95. ld. at 269 ("[T]he Statement of Policy published in the September 14, 1982 
issue of Spectrum [school newspaper] declared that 'Spectrum, as a student-press 
publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment."'). 
96. ld. at 270. 
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offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,"97 what effect would 
Hazelwood have on parent efforts under Pierce to exact 
curricular changes for their children? 
Hazelwood was understandingly welcomed by public school 
officials, but parents who have objected to curricular matters in 
public schools have not fared well in the wake of the decision. 
In Settle v. Dickson County School Board,98 the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld a teacher's refusal to allow a ninth 
grade student to fulfill a research assignment by writing on 
"The Life of Christ." Even though the teacher's assertions that 
personal religion was not an appropriate subject for discussion 
in a public school and that the paper could not satisfy the 
assignment by having four sources were inaccurate,99 the court 
held that "teachers have broad discretion in limiting speech 
when they are engaged in administering the curriculum."100 
Similarly, in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of 
Education, 101 the Sixth Circuit upheld the school board's refusal 
to accommodate a parent's request for an alternate reading 
series based on their religious objections to the one used in 
class. 102 In dismissing the parents' complaint because they had 
the option under Tennessee law of "either send[ing] them to 
church schools ... or teach[ing] them at home,"103 the court 
cited for approval to Bethel that "public schools serve the 
purpose of teaching fundamental values essential in a 
democratic society."104 
In Immediato v. Rye Neck School District/05 when parents 
objected to a high school's mandatory community service 
97. I d. at 273. 
98. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995). 
99. For a refutation of the teacher's claim that the student's only source would be 
the Bible, see R. Mawdsley & C. Russo, Religious expression and Teacher Control of the 
Classroom: A New Battleground for Free Speech, 107 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1996). 
100. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156. 
101. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
102. The parent who identified herself as a fundamentalist Christian objected to 
such themes in the school's Holt Reading Series as "evolution and secular humanism, 
futuristic supernaturalism, pacifism, magic, and false views of death." I d. at 1062. 
103. Id. at 1067. 
104. I d. at 1068 (quoting Fraser, 4 78 U.S. at 683). 
105. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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program, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discounted the 
parents' rights under Pierce because the school district had a 
"rational basis" in "teaching students the values and habits of 
good citizenship, and introducing them to their social 
responsibilities."106 
Finally, when a kindergarten student's thanksgiving poster 
with a religious theme was taken down from the school hallway 
and placed by the teacher in a less prominent place, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in C. H. v. Oliva, 107 cited to Hazelwood 
as governing 
'[S]tudent expression that IS part of a school 
curriculum,' including things that students say (or 
express by other means, such as artwork) when they are 
called upon by their teachers to express their own 
thoughts or views.108 
Bethel and Hazelwood have had a substantial impact on 
public schools by permitting greater school control over the 
school learning environment. In the process of exerting control 
over their schools, school officials have found that those actions 
will be upheld even when contrary to the desires of parents. 
Case law suggests that, whatever the right of parents to direct 
their children's education may mean outside the public schools, 
parents have few, if any, protectable rights within public 
schools. Whether new § 1983 legal theories for damages will 
change parents' claims within schools remains to be seen. 
C. New Causes of Action Under§ 1983 
Although § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 creates no 
substantive rights of its own, claimants can sue under § 1983 
for damages for violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal 
laws. 109 § 1983 has long been a remedy for violations of 
constitutional rights, but the difficult issue involving federal 
law remedies is whether Congress, in enacting laws, intended 
that a remedy for damages be available for violations of those 
106. I d. at 462. 
107. C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (2000). 
108. 226 F.3d at 205 (Alito & Mansmann, JJ., dissenting) (citing to C.H., 195 F.3d 
at 171). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). § 1983 permits lawsuits for damages for "the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws .... " 
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laws. 110 Prime examples are FERPA and IDEA Neither statute 
expressly authorizes a remedy for damages; and, thus, courts 
have had to determine whether providing a remedy for 
damages would be inconsistent with Congress' intent. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Falvo v. Owasso 
Independent School District No. I-011 111 that parents can sue 
for damages under § 1983 for an alleged violation of FERPA 
involving confidentiality or student records. In Falvo, parents 
had a claim on behalf of their child when a teacher permitted 
students to announce students' grades out loud. Most courts 
have held that a private damages remedy for a violation of 
FERPA is available under § 1983.112 Although the Supreme 
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit on statutory grounds, 113 it left 
open the question whether FERPA can support a § 1983 
claim. 114 Even though the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe115 that a FERPA claim under the 
nondisclosure part of the Act is not cognizable under § 1983, 
Congress could still amend FERPA to provide such a remedy.116 
110. See Wilder v. Va. Hasp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). The court stated 
therein: 
A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue 
under section 1983 unless (1) the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, 
privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983, or (2) Congress has 
foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself. 
111. Falvo v. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. No. l-Oll, 233 F.3d 1203 (lOth Cir. 2001), 
cert. granted, 533 U.S. 927 (2001). 
112. For cases supporting a§ 1983 claim under FERPA, see Tarka v. Cunningham, 
917 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1990); Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 
1986); Ackman v. Chisago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, 45 F.Supp.2d 664 (D. 
Minn. 1999); Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1996); 
Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist. No. 61-4, 876 F.Supp. 1104 (D.S.D. 1995); Belanger 
v. Nashua N.H. Sch. Dist., 856 F.Supp. 40 (D.N.H. 1994); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 
F.Supp. 1020 (W.D. Ark. 1991). For cases denying § 1983 claims, see Gundlach v. 
Teinstein, 924 F.Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Norris v. Bd. of Educ. of Greenwood 
Community Sch. Corp., 797 F.Supp. 1452 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
113. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002). 
114. A § 1983 claim under Falvo is all that much more important because federal 
courts have consistently held that FERPA does not permit a private cause of action. 
See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 122 F.Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2000); Hatfield v. 
East Grand Rapids Pub. Schools, 960 F.Supp. 1259 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Belanger, 856 
F.Supp. 40; Norris, 797 F.Supp. 1452. 
115. See Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390 (Wash. 2001), cert. granted, Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002) rev'd and remanded 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002). 
116. For an example of Congress's ability to eliminate parent claims, see the 1997 
amendments to IDEA where Congress removed a private cause of action for child in a 
private school to have services provided on-site at a private school if those services 
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However, should a § 1983 claim be justiciable using FERPA 
either through a Supreme Court decision or congressional 
amendment, the implications for public schools are troubling. If 
parents can sue for damages when students grade each others' 
papers and publicly recite their grades, will schools also be 
liable for other actions, such as posting the best student work 
on the assumption that the absence of it being posted is a 
negative commentary on a student's education record? 
The possibility of a § 1983 lawsuit for damages for 
violations of IDEA is much more controversial. Three Circuits, 
(the Second, Third, and Fifth)117 have held that an IDEA 
damages lawsuit is possible under § 1983, while three other 
Circuits (the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth),118 have ruled that 
plaintiffs may not ordinarily bring suit under § 1983 for 
statutory violations of IDEA. Damages under § 1983 for an 
IDEA violation have a significant impact on school districts 
already financially strapped to fund services for special 
education students. In addition to the cost of services required 
under IDEA, school districts that fail to meet IDEA's "free 
appropriate public education" and "least restrictive 
environment" requirements119 can be compelled to pay attorney 
fees for prevailing parties in a due process dispute, 120 as well as 
the cost of compensatory education.121 A§ 1983 damages claim 
opens school districts to the possibility of yet another cost: that 
of a damages award. The difference between the two kinds of 
costs is that while those dealing with related services, (and 
even attorney fees,) may have an element of reasonable 
predictability in many cases, a damages award does not. 
would be provided at a public school. See 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) and 34 C.F.R. § 
300.454. 
117. See Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 
484 (3d Cir. 1995); Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 
1990). See also Capillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 35 F.Supp.2d 1260 (D. Colo. 1999); 
Zearly v. Ackerman, 116 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.D.C. 2001). 
118. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. 
of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Heidmann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 
1021 (8th Cir. 1996). But see Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 131 F.Supp.2d 
1121 (D. Minn. 2000). 
119. For a sample of cases, see Allan Osborne, Students with Disabilities, in The 
Yearbook of Education Law 2000 174-77 (C. Russo, ed., Educ. Law Assn 2000). 
120. See e.g. Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. 918 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1990). 
121. See e.g. Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 19 IDELR 371 (Pa. 
Cmmw. 1992); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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A split in the circuits on the issue of damages under a 
federal statute is always discomforting. How school districts 
are affected depends solely on geography. For districts that are 
subject to § 1983 claims, school budgets already strained to 
meet the costs of special education services122 under IDEA must 
accommodate another possible expense. Litigation involving 
FERPA is nowhere near as extensive as that involving IDEA, 
although a judicial or legislative decision upholding a § 1983 
claim will very probably have the effect of increasing the 
number of lawsuits. Without a § 1983 damages claim, the only 
remedy under FERPA is the withholding of federal funds, a 
highly unlikely event. 123 
One can reasonably expect that the prospect of a damages 
award under FERPA and IDEA will provide parents with 
powerful leverage in addressing issues of education record 
confidentiality, special education services, and negotiating 
favorable settlements. Under FERPA, will school districts risk 
continuing practices that disclose identifiable information 
regarding a student's education record if a parent objects? Will 
even the most benign displays of student work be a 
discontinued practice because of a perception of the poor 
education record of those not displayed? Likewise, will school 
officials no longer have any incentive under IDEA to resist the 
requests for services by parents with special education 
students when an open-ended damages award is possible? 
Congress has the authority to act regarding judicially 
permitted damages awards under its laws. At least three 
legislative actions are possible. Congress could simply amend 
FERPA and IDEA to prohibit the recovery of damages; 
Congress could permit damages but limit the amount of 
recovery; or, Congress could permit recovery but set a high 
standard for a statutory violation, such as conduct by school 
officials. Given Congress's reluctance generally to address tort 
122. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a)(l)(A). It states that: 
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any 
educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which 
effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in 
attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may 
be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. 
123. For a discussion oflegal issues related to hearings under FERPA, see Thomas 
Johnson, Inaccurate and Misleading: Student Hearings Under FERPA, 114 Educ .. L. 
Rep. 721 (1997). 
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liability limits/24 one can question whether Congress will 
address damages limitations for FERPA or IDEA 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the rights of parents were first framed under common 
law in the nineteenth century, those rights have changed in 
large part because everything around them has also changed. 
When students were granted constitutional rights by the 
Supreme Court, the inevitable question, as indicated by Justice 
Douglas's dissenting comments in Yoder, was whose rights -
the parents or the students - were school officials going to deal 
with. The answer to that question still seems to be the rights of 
the parents, but only because the legal history in the United 
States has supported the identifying of student interests with 
those of their parents. 
However, if parents have preserved their rights vis-a-vis 
their children, those rights have not significantly impacted 
parents in their ability to effect changes within schools. As 
suggested by the reaffirmation of school authority under Bethel 
and Hazelwood, the rights of parents have diminished while 
those of school officials have been strengthened. New legal 
remedies suggest that, at least for certain areas within public 
schools, parent lawsuits for damages under § 1983 may 
significantly increase parent leverage on school officials. 
However, these § 1983 lawsuits will still not reach the 
curriculum areas where parents have been unsuccessful in 
effecting changes in the past. 
Even though parents have not been successful in facing 
changes within public schools through litigation, parents have 
achieved many of their goals to select the educational venue for 
their children. Many of the purposes that parents sought to 
achieve using the Meyer-Pierce-Yoder trilogy have been 
achieved, not in the courtroom, but in the assemblies of state 
legislatures and Congress. Parents have greater freedom today 
in choosing nonpublic venues for their children with state 
relaxation of regulatory control over those schools. At least one 
124. Congress has yet to pass legislation limiting recovery in products liability 
litigation, despite congressional reports recommending such a limit. See Sen. Rpt. 103-
203 (1993) (chronicles the abuse or compensation and client recovery in products 
liability litigation); H.R. Rpt. 104-63, at Part I, sec. 7 (1995) (proposed legislation 
limiting punitive damages recovery in products liability litigation to $250,000). 
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state, Texas, has given parents considerable legislative 
authority within schools. The extent to which other states will 
follow remains to be seen. 
Comparing the rights of parents today to those under 
common law in the nineteenth century is not easy. How one 
views the current status of rights of parents to direct the 
education of their children depends on where the children are 
being educated. For those who choose to educate their children 
outside public schools, the authority of parents is probably 
greater today if only because state statutory changes have 
limited the regulation of nonpublic schools. With fewer 
regulations of nonpublic schools, parents have more 
opportunities to select nonpublic school options for their 
children. For those children who stay within the public schools, 
the parents' rights to direct education are not as protected as 
under common law. This lack of protection is largely due to the 
greater authority that the Supreme Court has given to school 
officials in controlling curriculum. 
